■ We were departing Runway 18L from Charlotte. This flight was delayed due to an Estimated Departure Clearance Time (EDCT) into Newark. Tower cleared us for takeoff, and we began the takeoff roll.… Somewhere around the 100-knot callout, I noticed a white van a couple thousand feet ahead of us cross the hold short line and pass in front of us and across the runway.

■ The ferry maintenance flight…was uneventful until short final approach when severe windshear was experienced. I flew the airplane down to low approach altitude and relayed [the windshear] to the…Tower.… I realized the wind was not just as depicted or reported by the ASOS/AWOS…or the…Controller…as I requested two more low approaches, [resulting in] balked landings, go-arounds, and closed traffic, to get a feel for the wind. However, there are multiple windsocks on the field in different locations for the same runway. After a couple low approaches, I felt comfortable and was lined up on centerline to initial touchdown on the runway.… I decided to use no flaps to ensure less drift and more efficient aerodynamic directional control to safely land the airplane. Everything looked good and felt good on the last approach [until] touchdown. Then…a sudden burst of windshear made the airplane nearly uncontrollable. I had one tire on the ground on the initial crosswind touchdown at the moment I felt the gust (windshear). In that instant I had to decide whether to attempt another balked landing/go-around or to land and do my best to…control the airplane.

■ During…takeoff roll at ZZZZ…Runway XR full length, at…135 knots, which was below our V1 speed of 152 knots, we got a MASTER CAUTION, right PACK light…indication.

■ We were flying a visual approach to Indianapolis and when checking in with…Tower, were told to continue the approach. Then [another] aircraft was cleared onto the runway for takeoff. [That aircraft] did not start its takeoff roll until our aircraft was inside 300 feet. We were at approximately 100 feet with the aircraft still on the runway.

■ They passed by so fast that we barely had a second to process what had just happened. We were both startled by the van being on the runway, but before we could effectively process it, the van was gone. We continued the takeoff normally and rotated on schedule. During rotation we heard the Tower command the aircraft behind us to go around and to immediately turn left to 090°. Had the Tower not turned the aircraft, they may have been a proximity collision conflict to us. After commanding the landing aircraft to go around, the Tower Controller began yelling at the van driver to get him to identify himself.… The van driver either ignored or was not paying attention to the radio. Another six seconds later and we would have been a collision hazard with the van. We were almost a midair collision hazard with the airplane executing the go around.

■ I decided not to risk a potential stall or loss of directional control etc., due to the low airspeed, as I had touched down on the runway. I had to somewhat follow the path of the extreme windshear semi-controllably [to] get the airplane in a safe position. In order to do this, the wind pushed me off of the runway onto the grass where I felt it safer to stop the airplane and maintain control to the taxiway and away from any buildings, structures or persons. Once I got the airplane to a full stop, I called the Controller to request taxi to a facility on the field. He asked me to shut the airplane down away from any person, airplane, or property on the taxiway that I stopped at after leaving the runway and passing through the grass area. This was the first time in my years of flying that I encountered such severe windshear that I felt it safer to leave a runway rather than attempt more power for control to stay centered. I controlled the airplane to a safe position away from persons or property, safely walked away…and no persons [were] injured.

■ I…perceived the situation as unsafe to fly, due to a possible pressurization problem, due to the high altitude elevation of this airport, which is also surrounded by high altitude terrain. I was the pilot flying and rejected the takeoff. I exited the runway on Taxiway 1, held short of Runway XL, and told the passengers…to remain seated. ATC allowed us to hold short of Runway XL to run our checklist and coordinate with Operations to return to the gate. With distractions of communicating with ATC, executing our PACK light checklist, communicating to the passengers and flight attendants, and coordinating with operations, at some point, I unintentionally set the parking brake. When I noticed my honest mistake, I released it. While in [radio] communication with local Maintenance…they told us to set again the parking brake while a gate was being coordinated for us. I…communicated with my Dispatcher to provide an update of the situation and set a conference call with Maintenance Control. I indicated to Maintenance Control that I was holding my position with the parking brake set as [directed] by local Maintenance. After the call ended, local Maintenance called us and told us to release the parking brake as instructed by Maintenance Control. When a gate was available…I received a clearance to taxi.… At that point, I realized that the airplane was not moving. I called Maintenance to come and inspect the aircraft at our position. Maintenance… found the number 2 tire was flat. They showed up with a tow truck to park us at the gate. The tow truck did not move the aircraft either. We coordinated to bring stairs and buses to the airplane to deplane everybody. Maintenance started to work on the aircraft on Taxiway 1.

The next day, we flew the same airplane. During the takeoff roll on Runway XR, at around 130 knots, we got a MASTER CAUTION, right PACK light…indication. After evaluating the experience from the previous day, I was confident to continue the takeoff without rejecting, knowing that it was not going to cause a pressurization problem and the aircraft was not unsafe to fly. We executed our PACK light checklist, which cleared the malfunction. We continued to our destination. Maintenance was notified via the logbook and ACARS.

Low time Captain, high altitude airport, high altitude terrain surrounding the airport. Always follow standard operating procedures.

■ We initiated our own missed approach. Tower directed that we turn left 30 degrees. Had we not conducted the missed approach, it appeared that both aircraft would have been on the runway at the same time. While being vectored for a subsequent approach, I asked for and was given the phone number for the Tower Supervisor. Once on the ground, I contacted the Tower Supervisor and suggested that they pull the tapes and conduct an evaluation and training with respect to these events, as it was, in my opinion, grossly unsafe to allow the approach to continue, and that the missed approach should have been called for well before we initiated our own missed approach.