Issue 481
February 2020
This month, CALLBACK again offers the reader a chance to “interact” with the information given in a selection of ASRS reports. In “The First Half of the Story,” you will find report excerpts describing an event up to a point where a specific decision must be made, an immediate action must be taken, or a non-normal situation must be actively managed. You may then exercise your own judgment to make a decision, determine a possible course of action, or devise a plan that might best resolve the situation to a successful conclusion.
The selected ASRS reports may not provide all the information you want, and you may not be experienced in the type of aircraft involved, but each incident should give you a chance to refine your aviation judgment and decision-making skills. In “The Rest of the Story…” you will find the actions that were taken by reporters in response to each situation. Bear in mind that their decisions may not necessarily represent the best course of action, and there may not be a “right” answer. Our intent is to stimulate thought, training, and discussion related to the type of incidents that were reported.
The First Half of the Story
Deer in the Headlights PA23 Apache Commercial Pilot’s Report
■ I was cross-country.… While…performing my flare to land, but prior to the mains touching down, three deer ran across the runway from right to left and directly under my plane.
■ I was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) when we…departed Hawaii…for the flight back to the mainland. After leveling at cruise and checking in with San Francisco Radio (and making our first position report), I asked the Captain if we could set up a bathroom break. During that process the Captain’s mask became detached from the oxygen system, and he was forced to turn off the crew oxygen system supply due to uncontrolled flow.
■ While flying a filed IFR flight plan [in IMC], I experienced total electrical failure, resulting in [minimal] instruments and no radios operating.
■ During a [night] rolling takeoff [in VMC], the lights on Runway XXR failed. As we were transferring aircraft control from Captain to First Officer, a radio call from the previous takeoff informed Tower that the runway lights went out. Tower subsequently gave us a “Cancel takeoff if you’d like” instruction.
■ We encountered windshear inside the final approach fix.… Upon receiving the windshear warning, I advanced [the throttles to] full power and followed the Flight Director escape guidance. The First Officer/ Pilot Monitoring (FO/PM) advised Tower that we were going missed due to windshear. Once clear of the windshear, we cleaned up the aircraft and asked for delay vectors to remain in the area, as [we thought] the weather may have been clearing quicker, and we had sufficient fuel to hold. In the moments following, we received a call from the Flight Attendant (FA) and were told that she felt ill and…that many passengers were feeling sick due to the turbulence. During this call, another aircraft had gone missed due to the same windshear.
The Rest of the Story
The Reporter's Action
■ I immediately and simultaneously added power and pulled the nose up to go around, but was not able to completely clear the animals. I heard and felt a significant double impact under the plane while initiating the go-around. Immediately following the loud double impact, I instinctively looked at the mirror on my right engine and saw the nose gear dangling back and forth freely. At that moment, I opted to abort the go-around. I retarded the throttles to idle and landed roughly 1,000 feet down the runway. As expected, the nose gear completely collapsed.
The Reporter's Action
■ In accordance with Extended Operations (ETOPS) requirements, we initiated a turn-around back to Hawaii. During that process we had very difficult communication with San Francisco Radio and very little communication with Honolulu on VHF. We were unable to clearly ascertain our altitude clearance, so after discussing it, we elected to vertically offset. When we confirmed the clearance, we returned to our original altitude and returned to Hawaii uneventfully.
The Reporter's Action
■ Using my cell phone, I called Flight Service and asked them to relay to Approach that I was climbing to VFR conditions and reversing course. It was relayed to Approach. I…checked the fuses, found none popped, and continued north at about 7,500 feet. I saw an opportunity to descend to clear skies and did so. When VMC and around 2,000 feet, I was able to contact a family member and asked that person to notify Tower of my proposed landing, which was done. Tower gave me a green light as I prepped for landing, but when close to touchdown, they saw that my gear was up. They switched to a red light that I didn’t see, but my emergency gear extension worked, so my gear dropped just in time. Tower called me and told me of the late deployment of my landing gear and said to call the Supervisor at Approach, which I did immediately [after concluding the flight]. The Supervisor told me that they did get the call from Flight Service and saw the climb, turn, and descent, but that I should have landed at the closest airport. I said I was in the clouds or above heavy broken [clouds]. I couldn’t see the ground and thought it prudent to return to a familiar airport. The Supervisor told me that, during my descent, I was in Class B, and since they couldn’t read my altitude, I could have caused approach problems for the big guys, but that they were glad I got down safely. I am still awaiting the avionics shop to diagnose the problem.
The Reporter's Action
■ Based upon how clearly we could see, various radio chatter, aircraft position, power (takeoff power set), and inter-cockpit communication, I felt the safest course of action was to continue. The fact that the lights had failed on the runway was basically the last thing we registered during our transitional duties and various radio chatter from Airport Operations, Tower, and other aircraft. Albeit nighttime, our ability to discern the centerline and runway edges remained clear. Visibility was 10 miles plus.
The Reporter's Action
■ I made the decision to divert to our filed alternate due to the safety and consideration of the passengers and crew onboard. We would not put them through the same approach and, more than likely, receive the same result. Dispatch, ATC, Flight Attendants, and passengers were informed of the decision to divert. We sent a message to Dispatch asking to have medics standing by as a precaution for the passengers who had felt ill. This request was also forwarded…to ATC. No emergency was declared. We landed at the alternate without incident, and medical personnel met the aircraft at the jet bridge, walked down the aisle, and ensured that each passenger was well. All were in good health and happy to disembark.
We had been delayed two and a half hours on the ground out of [our departure field] and rerouted/refiled at 8,000 feet.… I had asked for maximum fuel onboard in anticipation of weather and ground delays.… All these elements had been taken into consideration and added to our plan.… [We had] reviewed windshear escape maneuvers, go-around procedures, crosswind limitations, and diversion/hold procedures. All had been briefed.
We had been delayed two and a half hours on the ground out of [our departure field] and rerouted/refiled at 8,000 feet.… I had asked for maximum fuel onboard in anticipation of weather and ground delays.… All these elements had been taken into consideration and added to our plan.… [We had] reviewed windshear escape maneuvers, go-around procedures, crosswind limitations, and diversion/hold procedures. All had been briefed.