Automated
Surface Observing System (ASOS) is the current weather reporting equipment
at many airports. However, some pilots and controllers believe that
this equipment occasionally provides inconsistent or unreliable weather
information to users. Our first report, from a General Aviation pilot,
illustrates:
- Weather
at XYZ was reported as clear, visibility 7-10 miles, no remarks.
I checked the ATIS repeatedly during the last 45 minutes of the
flight. No change from clear and 8 miles. There was frequent lightning
ahead with indications of storm activity on the [aircrafts]
weather avoidance equipment.
The ASOS at XYZ is supposed
to be attended and augmented as necessary. In this case, a thunderstorm
was close enough to the airport to be seen and heard, but there was
no mention of it on the official weather.
Another reporter, an experienced
weather observer, explains how the ASOS can arrive at these apparently
inconsistent weather reports.
- The ceilometer
only sees clouds directly over its sensor. This means on a dreary
overcast day, if there is one small break in the clouds over the
sensor, it calls the sky clear. Furthermore, the visibility sensors...generally
show the visibility to be much greater than it actually is.
Some technical advances
have improved the accuracy of ASOS readings and increased the frequency
of broadcast updates. However, the equipment is programmed to update
ASOS and ATIS broadcasts only when a significant weather change occurs.
For more information, check out the ASOS Users Guide on the
Web at:
http://www.nws.noaa.gov/asos/index.html
In another report to ASRS,
a Local Controller notes that the location of ASOS sensing devices
may generate wind reports that differ from those produced by sensors
elsewhere on an airport.
- [ASOS] wind
instrument is installed at the south end of the airport in a partially
sheltered location. [The reading] differs by 50 degrees or more during
northwest winds when compared to mid-field wind sensors. Additionally,
this sensor is 2 miles from the approach end of Runway 19. I believe
this instrument does not give a good representation of wind conditions.
Tower and Approach have direct-reading instrument from the mid-field
sensor.
Reports such as this one,
sent either directly to airport management or to ASRS, have resulted
in the relocation of ASOS sensing equipment at several airports.
In
an old Walt Disney movie, Jiminy Cricket sang a song that ended, "...and
always let your conscience be your guide." A Tower Controller did
just that, stating in his ASRS report that, "the only valid information
the pilot had in this case was my notably unauthorized remark."
- The [small]
aircraft had just turned base to final to Runway 16, having been cleared
to land while it was on downwind. [At that time, I issued] the ASOS
wind at 100 degrees at 8 knots. A thunderstorm was about three miles
west of the field. I felt the Tower buffeted by the wind. I issued
to the pilot, based on observation of [current] ASOS and the parking
lot, "ASOS wind variable at 4 knots, in reality its bending
the trees."
The aircraft required 3,200 feet of runway to land. On touchdown,
the ASOS still read variable at 4 knots. As the aircraft exited the
runway, ASOS updated the wind to 250 degrees at 9 knots gusting to
16 knots, then 270 degrees at 15 knots gusting to 21 knots.
The originally reported wind was 170 degrees different from the actual
wind at the time of landing, and 2.5 times the velocity and approaching
the aircrafts demonstrated crosswind landing capability.
Controllers may not transmit
specific values (such as the ceiling, visibility, or, in this case,
wind), other than those listed in the current ASOS. The exceptions include
airports at which an official weather observer is on site, or at which
the weather report has been composed or verified by the weather station.
Pilots must therefore rely on their basic piloting skills (for example,
observation of a wind sock or comparison of ground speed vs. airspeed)
for final determination of safe landing conditions. To read more about
a Controllers role in disseminating weather information, refer
to the Air Traffic Control Handbook (7110.65L, Paragraph 2-6-7).
A final thought from a
controller who is also a weather observer charged with trying to update
the ASOS report during changing weather conditions:
- I attempted
to manually override the system, but it was so slow, we were still
reporting VFR while the storm raged outside. If you are using weather
from an automated station, when the weather is changing rapidly,
dont believe what is being reported.
Parachute
jumping activity in high-density traffic areas can pose hazards to the
parachutists, the jump plane, and other aircraft sharing the airspace.
In the following report, a jump plane pilot describes an incident in which
the parachutists jumped after the pilot had been advised by ATC to hold
them.
- I was flying
skydivers at 10,500 feet MSL on a Victor airway. As per Centers
request, I announced, "Jumpers away in one minute." After
that, Center issued an advisory of traffic at 10,000 feet MSL. The
instructions were to hold the skydivers until the traffic was clear.
However, as this advisory was being issued, the jumpers were already
poised outside the aircraft. The jumpers left the aircraft, at which
time [a commuter turboprop] at 10,000 feet MSL altered his course
to avoid the skydivers and me.
The commuter Captain saw
the incident a little differently:
- Enroute on
a Victor airway, in communication with Center. [We received] ATC clearance
to descend from 10,000 feet to 8,000 feet, and a traffic issuance
of jump aircraft on the airway approximately 5 miles at 10,500 feet.
TCAS II verified target at 12 oclock. At approximately 3 miles,
the aircraft appeared visually. Within 30 seconds of [the plane being]
in view, I observed a parachutist jump and a parachute begin to open.
We immediately began a turn to avoid. Then a second jumper appeared.
We increased our turn rate and reduced descent rate. The jump aircraft
then turned and began a descent towards us. The second jumper passed
us approximately 500 feet laterally and 500 feet vertically. The [jump
aircraft] pilot was [on the same Center frequency] as we were. We
heard Center tell the pilot, "Stop jumps..." before this
event happened.
Since the commuter crew had
heard the instruction for the jump activity to cease, they were not
prepared for the sudden appearance of the jumpers.
An unplanned encounter with
powerlines is an experience most pilots do not soon forget. Our first
reporter, a glider-tow pilot, had avoided some well-known powerlines
on numerous prior approaches, but a downdraft at just the wrong moment
changed all that:
- After towing
a glider to 2,000 feet AGL, I entered a normal left-hand pattern for
Runway 03. As I turned short final at about 350-400 feet, some sink
was encountered. After crossing the last house and powerlines, I felt
a slight tug on the aircraft. A normal landing followed. Upon visual
inspection from the ground, 4-6 feet of the 200-foot tow rope had
snagged, broken off, and was hanging in the powerlines crossing the
end of Runway 03. No powerlines were down and no damage could be detected.
The local utility...came and removed the piece of tow rope.
My error occurred when I did not add power once the sink was encountered.
All remaining approaches were re-routed over a less hazardous route
(fewer wires), accompanied by a steep slipping final approach, so
the tow rope would remain up behind the aircraft and not hang down
below.
We hope that "less hazardous
route" becomes the standard route at this glider port from now
on.
Another
General Aviation pilot, also familiar with the powerlines at a local airport,
overlooked an important factor about best-rate-of-climb in an aircraft
that was a variant of the model usually flown. The result was a very tight
squeeze between the ground below and the powerlines above.
- Before taking
the active runway, I noted that the checklist called for a VR of 55
knots. However, I failed to notice the asterisk indicating that 55
knots required two notches of flaps (25 degrees). Prior experience
taking off [from here] proved that a normal takeoff could be accomplished
without the use of flaps, but at a VR of 60-65 knots.
...Reaching 55 knots, I rotated the airplane. The stall light came
on so I reduced pitch slightly. By this time, I was about two-thirds
of the way down the runway and had climbed no higher than 5 feet.
I attempted to abort. The end of the runway was quickly approaching,
and I knew I could either continue braking and possibly put the plane
over a 2-3-foot bank and into a canal...or I could add full power
and attempt to climb and avoid the obstacles. There are powerlines...12-15
feet high at the departure end of the runway. I applied full power,
climbed over the bank and the canal, maintained a 1-2 foot clearance
over [a field of grapevines], and avoided the powerlines approximately
3 feet above me. As I saw the powerlines pass overhead, I noted the
airspeed at 65 knots, sufficient to establish a climb...
From this experience I have learned to review the speeds critical
to proper rotation and climbout as noted in the pilot handbook, not
on the checklists, and to have a pre-determined point at which to
attempt a safe abort.
Our reporter is lucky to
have survived such a close encounter with 120 kv of electricity.